Following the humiliation of a 6-0 defeat against Club Brugge last month, Russell Martin changed his set-up for the first time as Rangers head coach.
It meant that his side conceded the fewest chances in any single game this season (0.23xG) against Celtic but amassed only 0.17xG themselves. The trade-off for a stronger resolve against the ball was a drop in Rangers' own creative numbers, which, as already explained, come in at the third-lowest across the entire division. Up until that Old Firm, Martin’s 4-3-3 system looked something like the average passing network below taken from a 1-1 draw with Dundee; full-backs narrower than wingers, a lone No.6 and two high No.8s.
Against Hearts and Celtic, as demonstrated in the following first-half passing network, the shape was more 4-2-3-1, with Mo Diomande and Connor Barron taking turns to push higher from the base of midfield, Thelo Aasgaard at No.10, Jaden Meghoma overlapping to provide width on the left and James Tavernier tucking inside to form a back three.
In possession, it looked like this: a midfield box and 3-4-3 on the ball, with Meghoma wide on the left out of shot here.
It should be stated that on another day, Martin’s side would probably win against Hearts if the referee's calls were correct. However, Rangers could very conceivably have lost at home to Dundee if not for a late penalty last month and were somewhat fortunate to draw away at Motherwell on the opening day. With an xG difference of 0.02 so far (title-winning teams in Scotland would hope the distance between chances conceded and created on average to float around the 1.5 mark), they are reaping what they sow.
Plus, it was only when Martin reverted to a 4-3-3 and introduced Joe Rothwell after the break that a brief, modest upturn followed. In the 15 minutes or so that Rothwell played at the base of midfield, the home side fashioned 47% of their xG on the day (0.5 of a 1.07 total) from 55 to 68 minutes as seen below. The Englishman has appeared heavy-legged compared to the frozen out Nico Raskin, and it would be churlish to hold up the former Leeds midfielder as the answer to Martin’s side’s troubles.
However, in comparison to what went before him against Derek McInnes’ side, the small spell of momentum garnered in Martin’s original 4-3-3 shape shows why that formation, and one of Raskin and Rothwell, must start against Hibs on Saturday in a do-or-die League Cup fixture.
The approach Martin had utilised from the start played right into Hearts' hands for a few reasons. Only Meghoma was running beyond, with big distances to cover pushing up from full-back because Mikey Moore, Aasgaard and Gassama wanted the ball to feet. Meanwhile, Bojan Miovski was trying to link up play with Rangers’ back three attempting to fire passes into his feet, which was ultimately where the first concession originated.
It’s hard to escape the feeling that Martin’s set-up was heavily influenced by the fact that, not only did he want a little more security against the ball, but with Rothwell not fit enough to start and Raskin in the stands, no one could knit together play in the No.6 role. Barron’s brief cameo in that spot after half-time revealed as much.
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However, the knock-on effect of shifting many individuals about blunted Rangers’ already faltering attack. For example, Aasgaard and Djeidi Gassama are far more effective on the left than the right where they started, especially when playing against a deep defence. On the left, they can receive while protecting the ball and chop inside onto their favoured foot, on the right, they’re left to constantly cut back, working with less favourable angles.
That issue was also exacerbated because Tavernier could not play the high and wide full-back role like Meghoma (it’s no longer 2020 Tavernier) and Max Aarons is shot on confidence. Diomande is not a No.6 and while Rangers obviously missed Raskin’s ability to snuff out counterattacks, they also lacked his defensive nous. The Ivorian midfielder failed to track Lawrence Shankland into the box for the first goal and gave away a penalty for the second.
All of the above led to Martin’s side lacking the shape and personnel to play through the press centrally and open up gaps elsewhere. This was one defining tactical trait they were getting right at points earlier in the season and would in the second half - the first phase of build-up.
The lead-up to Shankland’s opening goal demonstrated the home side’s issues playing through the pitch in a new shape. Firstly, notice the home side in their back three and narrow midfield box. The only real pass for Tavernier below is wide to the right, but ideally, you want a left footer to drive infield when receiving where Aasgaard and Gassama are.
Tavernier exchanges passes with Gassama, who has to play backwards instead of taking on his man, because he’s receiving on his less comfortable side.
Now, as Tavernier looks to play forward, Hearts are set up well to protect against central passes. Barron moves forward, aiming to make a run off of Miovski, but the new No.9 is on his toes, ready to run behind.
The principle is the same one we saw Martin’s side try to enact earlier in the season in games like Panathanaikos and Plzen (using a third-man pass to create a two-vs-one overload), but the move breaks down too easily.
And although Shankland ought to have been penalised for a handball, the home side still had ample opportunities to stop Hearts. Crucially, Diomande only tracked Hearts' No.9 up to a point, failing to properly pass on responsibilities to Nasser Djiga.
After the break, Martin reverted to a 4-3-3, which opened up better angles while also moving Aasgaard and Gassama back to the left. Things would only improve when Rothwell replaced Barron at the base of midfield, with the 30-year-old able to drive on the ball and receive in tight areas/
This passage of play in the below GIF demonstrates a few contrasting themes to the above example.
Firstly, notice how Rangers can create space and break through the Hearts team by creating a two-vs-one with Rothwell and Aasgaard, over smaller distances than hitting Miovski's feet.
Rangers’ 4-3-3 shape offers up more passing angles, with full-backs and wingers wide, keeping the centre free.
Rothwell has the technical ability to play through the pitch and drive with the ball, with the 4-3-3 also enabling a vertical attack, which one of Aasgaard and Diomande should eventually finish.
Meanwhile, Gassama playing on his natural side enables the winger to receive comfortably and carry forward, instead of immediately being pressed backwards by his man. This attracts four markers, enabling Rothwell to pick out two free men with a cross on the opposite side of the pitch.
Was it perfect? The end result shows clearly not, but as Martin fights for his Rangers future, he must revert back to his original idea this weekend. To achieve that, one of Rothwell and Raskin needs to anchor the midfield against Hibs on a day where the need for both performance and result has never been more pressing.
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