Some draws feel like a defeat: Rangers’ 2-2 reverse with Celtic yesterday is one such example, especially because the same factors that allowed Danny Rohl’s side to build a two-goal lead would later hand Celtic the ascendancy.
When Youssef Chermiti was applauded up the tunnel after a special first-half performance, it seemed for all the world that post-match discourse would focus on how Rohl won the game by playing the protagonist.
Instead, all the inquiries post-match focused on why Rangers’ drop-off was so drastic after the break. But Rohl did not appear to consciously make tactical changes at the break that caused his team’s levels to fall off a cliff around 50 minutes.
The issue? Once the tempo of the match dropped, Rangers’ inability to control or kill the game with their possession was exposed. The fast, frenetic routes forward that suited the home side before the break simply handed over control after it. And personnel changes did not alter the approach. Rangers kept playing directly in the second period and gave the ball back to Celtic repeatedly.
In a clichéd game of two halves, Rangers’ extra man at the top end of the park showed in the first half and Celtic’s extra man in the middle showed in the second.
The home side were well worth their two-goal lead and bent the game to their will before the break, winning duels, playing forward directly and dominating the box. However, in the second period, O’Neill’s changes enabled Celtic to set the tempo with their possession and gradually gain more and more territory and control.
Rohl, often able to influence games from the bench, could not match the half-time effect he had in a 3-1 Old Firm win this January.
As the race chart below demonstrates, come full-time, Celtic had swung the momentum right back in their favour.
The sour taste for those leaving Ibrox yesterday was borne of an inability to capitalise on ascendancy and manage the game from that two-goal vantage point. Individually and collectively, to win a title, you cannot pass up such an advantage. Stats do not paint the full picture and any viewer of Sunday’s first half would have acknowledged that Rohl’s side had Celtic fully on the ropes. They should never have allowed the visitors the bandwidth to recover.
Rohl opted for the same starting XI that beat Hearts 4-2 a fortnight ago and his side’s approach was a mirror image of that day. That told us that the German wanted his side to be brave with their tactical plan and implement their game against Celtic.
So often, we have seen various managers in the Ibrox dugout cede possession and react in Old Firm games from the start. In simple terms, they have acknowledged Celtic’s superior composure on the ball and often man-marked the Callum McGregor captain to tame his influence from the start.
Yesterday, Rohl was proactive, challenging Celtic to instead play the game on Rangers’ terms by lining up in a 4-2-2-2. Again, in black-and-white terms, in the first half, Rangers set those terms of engagement and took the risk of being outnumbered in midfield. After the break, that risk started to hurt them.
Chermiti’s goals were individual moments of brilliance. Much like strikes against Hearts, though, note the number of bodies that arrived in the final third at each strike and how either chance originated.
The first, created after left-back Tuur Rommens regained possession high up the pitch, featured a long ball forward to gain territory, playing over Celtic’s attack and midfield. Note that Rangers have a five-vs-five as soon as they enter the final third. The upside of their direct approach was the speed at which such situations could be fashioned.
Just before Andreas Skov Olsen crosses the ball, Chermiti is one of nine Rangers players in the picture.
And the second goal? Although Dane Murray’s slip was key in the build-up, Rangers worked their way into the final third with a direct, channelled pass, won the second ball and then loaded the box.
Do not let this be branded merely as hit-and-hope football. No, Rangers’ tactical acumen enabled their dominance in the first half.
Dujon Sterling was slightly deeper than Rommens as the hosts overloaded the left-hand side and successfully pinned Celtic back in their box. Ryan Naderi was excellent at winning second balls and progressing forward. Mikey Moore, dovetailed by Rommens, was outstanding before the break. And what can you say about either Chermiti strike? The two-goal lead was established by football that was aggressive and skilled in equal measure.
However, every plan has its weaknesses.
The trade-off for having so many players at the top end of the park was sacrificing one player in midfield. After the break, exacerbated by Celtic changes, that started to show.
By the interval, Celtic’s xG stood at just 0.07. They had attempted just one shot, a Daizen Maeda header from a corner. Moving the Japanese forward centrally at half-time spooked John Souttar, leading to the captain on the day being out of position for Celtic’s penalty win, and rushed Jack Butland’s clearances. And in the middle, Reo Hatate provided a composure in possession that calmed his entire team and constantly retained control.
It is important to stress that Rohl did not seem to instruct Rangers to sit back. He only made changes after Celtic’s first goal (was it perhaps an error, with the obvious benefit of hindsight, not to tighten up the midfield earlier?), but even in the first minutes after the break, a third for the hosts felt more likely than a deficit-halver.
So much of football’s flow is simple. Are you playing on your toes or your heels? Is the momentum with you or your opponent? As Rangers tired and the crowd grew anxious, play crept closer towards their goal.
Now Celtic’s extra man in midfield started to show – just think of how many free shots they had at the edge of the box. And when Rangers continued to play long to one striker, instead of two, the direct routes that supported their cause in the first half now worked against them.
Their age-old issue of not killing games with possession, or indeed controlling them, reared its head. And with the team caught between pressing and defending deep, a lack of compactness showed. Rohl did bring Diomande on but seemed to place him ahead of Raskin and Chukwuani, instead of reverting to the tight 4-3-3 that worked so well at Parkhead.
Often, that left Hatate as the free man in midfield.
Because Diomande was pressing as the second striker, and not in a three-man midfield, it allowed Celtic to gain a three-vs-two in midfield.
Raskin, Chukwuani and Gassama's reactions below all show an indecision in Rangers' pressing approach as they tired. They lacked the compactness that won the game at Parkhead in the second half.
Rangers’ biggest issue was their use of the ball, however. Instead of using it to rest from a period of Celtic pressure, they simply gave it away and invited more.
If Hatate’s distribution evoked calm in his team, Butland’s brought panic. The goalkeeper completed just 34 per cent of his passes after the break. With yellow denoting an unsuccessful pass, just look at how many long balls simply started another Celtic attack.
There is a famous saying from Juanma Lillo, a former Pep Guardiola assistant: “The quicker the ball goes forward, the quicker it comes back.” How true that was on Sunday, as in situations like the following.
Clearing danger just invited more of it.
In Butland’s defence, Rangers were not primed to play through pressure. However, when Chermiti lost Naderi behind him to win second balls, Rangers were unable to use attritional methods to gain territory.
Is that on Rohl or the players? Rangers changed personnel with Diomande coming on, but not their approach as shown above. That led to them playing long to one striker instead of two, and trying to press a Celtic midfield when they had tired legs.
Everything is connected in football. It is naive to think that Rangers can attack as vigorously in the opening 45 and then become a pure possession team and ignore direct instincts after the break. However, they should have managed the game so much better from their point of advantage.
The upside of Rangers’ system was seen in the first 50 minutes: direct attacks, numbers high up the pitch, vertical routes forward, and an overwhelming presence in the box.
The downside from that point onwards was evident too; Long balls became a weakness and when calm was needed, panic followed.
Rohl correctly pointed out in his post-match press conference that two teams play the game. For example, all the post-match rhetoric in January focused on what Rohl changed to turn that Old Firm, not why Celtic dropped off.
However you square it, though, this was a missed opportunity and not one that should have been allowed to pass.
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