Styles make fights, and by the half-hour mark at Ibrox on Sunday, Motherwell had Rangers staggering on the ropes. Danny Rohl retreated to his bench, seeking a plan B to correct a bold plan A that needed more than just minor tweaks.
As injury time approached, it looked as though his latest tactical tinker might get Rangers out of jail again. Much like the 3-1 win at Parkhead in January, Rangers’ aggressive pressing before the break left them open and vulnerable. Only a shift to a more compact 4-3-3, alongside changes from the bench, altered the game.
Not this time. As the hosts pushed for a third, the mountain they had left themselves to climb proved insurmountable when Motherwell scored a winner on the break.
Rohl and Rangers paid the price for a first-half plan that went badly wrong, and will surely inform how they approach the final four games of the season. Despite creating the better chances on the day (2.54 to 0.59 xG), Motherwell’s ability to impose their game on Rangers paid dividends.
What went so wrong before the break? This wasn’t a case of Rangers only waking up at half-time. Instead, it was a story of the wrong team selection and the wrong plan.
Why Rangers were chasing shadows before the break
Most fans were happy to see Rohl revert to a 4-4-2, but there was a reason this was the first time Youssef Chermiti and Bojan Miovski had started together. Neither can supplement the midfield nor win second balls like Ryan Naderi.
Both coaches set up proactively, hoping to make the other react. Jens Berthel Askou’s Motherwell, as ever, wanted to bait the press and create space to play through the pitch, consistently creating an extra man in possession. Rohl, meanwhile, aimed to create space behind by playing directly into his two strikers.
It was the Steelmen, however, who dictated the game on their terms and at their tempo, leaving the home side chasing shadows in the opening 45 minutes.
Rangers planned to create situations like the below, sucking Motherwell high up the pitch and playing directly into Miovski and Chermiti.
Notice Tochi Chukwuani's body language here. Pointing for Jack Butland to go wide instead of trying to play through the centre.
But when the ball did land in the final third early on, despite some encouraging positions, no knock-out blow could be struck.
Crucially, this 'press baiting' from Rangers relied on Motherwell pressing aggressively; they weren’t incentivised once ahead.
There was logic in Rohl selecting the midfield and forward line that scored five second-half goals against Falkirk. With two weeks to prepare, the plan was clearly considered. As in games against Hearts and Celtic, could Rangers start fast, play direct and overwhelm the opposition with physicality?
Very early on, though, Rohl may have regretted that bold choice. It was reminiscent of the Parkhead game at New Year, when his side pressed man for man and were pulled apart by Celtic’s rotations.
Rangers didn’t have a ‘plus one’, an extra man behind the ball to provide cover or in midfield to offer a passing option. After Motherwell’s 16th-minute opener settled nerves, that absence was felt. The away side didn’t jump up as readily, leaving Rangers without the space to play directly in behind. Without the ball, the lack of a third body in midfield was just as evident.
As Paul McGinn explained: “If you take the lead at Ibrox, then you know what the fans are like, you need to try and get the ball back. The fans don’t realise, but they’re almost playing into our hands because they’re desperate for their players to break the shape and come out to get it back off us.
“That means we can pick you off slightly easier. It’s human nature, it doesn’t matter how much you’ve been drilled, the fact that Motherwell have got the ball at 1-0 up, you need to try and get that back at Ibrox.”
Had Chermiti exploited early spaces, or Djeidi Gassama been awarded a penalty shortly after Rangers conceded (remember how quickly they equalised against Hearts in February), things could have been different. But conceding early left their plan vulnerable to the state of the game.
What went wrong - and then right - according to Rohl
Asked why his side appeared off the pace before the interval, Rohl said: “We were not consequential in our front-foot defending. That was the reason why they had the overload in the centre. We were a little bit too slow in the last line to push up and to mark them, to be more aggressive, that was difficult.”
In short, Motherwell had an extra man in midfield, and it showed. Rangers were on the back foot instead of the front, reacting to rotations rather than controlling them.
Here’s an early example of Rangers’ press failing and leading to the visitors playing through the pitch in one or two passes.
Thelo Aasgaard tries to pass on his man, Elliot Watt, in midfield, but neither central midfielder steps forward, likely pinned back by runners behind them. Rangers are reacting to rotations, not forcing Motherwell into a pressing trap.
One pass bypasses the whole Rangers team, with the defence also too slow to step up, a sign of things to come.
Because Rangers were reacting instead of imposing, they were constantly playing catch-up, chasing shadows. This allowed Motherwell to maintain overloads around the ball.
The visitors’ second goal typified all of Rohl’s above points.
First, it derives from Raskin giving the ball away here. Rangers’ line-up didn’t give them sufficient ball carriers to get up the pitch, which stretched the game in Motherwell’s favour.
From here, we see the reality of Rohl’s side not defending on the front foot in a line-up with two strikers, not designed to win a midfield battle against Motherwell’s technicians.
Because they were pressing individuals more than staying compact, as they did in the second half with an extra midfielder, when Rangers fell back into a block, it was too easy for Motherwell’s rotations to create space.
Below, Aasgaard, Sterling and Raskin all jump up to try and show Motherwell to one side of the pitch, but the away team manipulate the Rangers shape, led again by the excellent Watt. Rohl’s side are “not consequential in their front-foot defending.”
Watt, who has dropped into a back three, faces half-hearted pressure from Miovski and can wrap the ball into Callum Slattery, who has drifted off Fernandez. As Rohl explained, the last line was too slow to push up and engage.
Notice that because Sterling has previously stepped up, he is now behind Manny Longelo, who will score from a cross. Motherwell players were consistently ‘between’ Rangers lines, with the hosts reacting too late.
A game of risk and reward
Rohl’s changes at the break were an admission of what he got wrong in his team selection. Moving to a 4-3-3 with an extra man in midfield offered greater security off the ball and, crucially, greater control on it.
Although Rangers had an extra man higher up the pitch before the break, the profiles of Mikey Moore and Mo Diomande, compared to Miovski and Chukwuani, were much better suited to receiving under pressure.
Their first goal on the day was a clear example. This time, it’s Rangers manipulating the Motherwell shape, with Raskin, Moore and Aasgaard dropping deep, drawing opponents forward and creating space to play into. They now had sufficient numbers to create their own overload.
In short, they had an extra passing option, a four-vs-two in the middle, which stopped them from routinely going long and losing possession. In the first half, Butland’s kicking often invited pressure, whereas Callum Ward’s relieved it. Rangers still struggle to control possession under intense pressure.
Similarly, their press after the break was more effective because of the extra man deeper on the pitch - and given that it crowded the ball. This allowed Rangers to react to Motherwell’s rotations with greater security, stepping forward rather than chasing backwards.
Look at how narrow and compact they are here, as McGinn is forced into a loose pass. Gassama's clever pressing limits his finding of the 'free man' on the far side of the pitch.
With a 'plus one' at the back, the home side could more regularly press to keep Motherwell pinned back.
Now the tone of the game was set by the fact that Motherwell couldn't play out, as Rangers had experienced themselves before the break. Chances like this below, fired over by Chermiti, were borne from a change in pressing shape.
Much like the second-half shape at Parkhead, Rangers looked far stronger when they protected the middle of the pitch, even if the opposition had a free man out wide.
The downside of Askou’s system is the risk taken deep to create space higher up. But even in situations like the one below, after winning possession high up the pitch, Rangers were unable to punish them. Even then, Motherwell played out more than Rangers regained.
Rohl added: “They were really effective. When I count the big chances from them and from us, I don’t know how many big chances they had.”
Rangers were punished for the risks in their system, failing to control possession and not capitalising when space appeared. Motherwell, by contrast, were not punished for their risks and did capitalise on the reward.
By the time they changed their approach, the mountain was too high. Now they must win at Tynecastle on Monday night.
This fits a broader pattern. Rangers remain a better team when reacting rather than dictating. Their ability to “set the tone” against Celtic and Hearts at Ibrox relied on physicality, which they struggled to replicate without Ryan Naderi and Tuur Rommens, a key miss with Jayden Meghoma also replaced at half-time.
If anything, this may convince Rohl to opt for a 4-3-3 at Parkhead and Tynecastle. He said afterwards that the next step is for his side to perform at their highest level for a full 90 minutes. Simply, Rangers don't look ready to impose their game on their title rivals away from home.
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