The transfer window may still have weeks to run, but for Derek McInnes and Rangers, the real football is about to begin.
Seven new signings have bolstered his squad so far this summer, with the club working on a further two additions ahead of Friday’s trip to face Dundee United at Tannadice, one of which is South African centre-back Olwethu Makhanya.
So, what has pre-season taught us about the tactical and personnel blueprint McInnes is likely to use in Tayside and beyond? Here’s a closer look.
Shifting shapes and formations
Across Rangers’ two public pre-season friendlies, we’ve seen four different on-ball shapes: a 4-4-2 and 4-2-2-2 against Saint Etienne, before McInnes’ side started in a 4-3-3 against West Ham and shifted to a 3-5-2 at the break.
Against the French side, Rangers looked vulnerable to runs in behind, largely because they were a man light in midfield while both centre-backs attempted to step in. That issue was addressed by replacing Findlay Curtis with Cammy Devlin at the break, restoring an extra body and balance centrally, full-backs offering width and a platform established higher up the pitch.
As previously outlined, McInnes was reluctant to fully unveil his “philosophy” upon his appointment as Rangers boss or to eulogise about core principles, but he “has a clear idea of what his team should look like”. While he is not rigidly tied to one formation, certain traits are non-negotiable.
Those guiding principles appear to include playing with two strikers where possible, marking man for man, progressing the ball forward quickly and operating from a loose 4-4-2 structure.
There are clear differences from Danny Rohl’s approach. Most notably, there are fewer rotations in possession, such as midfielders dropping into full-back zones or between centre-backs, with a greater emphasis on positional clarity, particularly out of possession. The attacking structure is also more defined compared to the fluidity of Rohl's front four.
Expect continued tweaks in both personnel and shape throughout the campaign, as seen with McInnes’ Hearts side last season. Unpredictability can come through structure, but also through individuals; for example, Curtis’ off-ball movement from the left contrasts with Aasgaard’s tendency to drop towards the ball.
Core principles to note
In all but one half of football so far, McInnes has deployed two strikers, used lopsided width and built from a strong defensive base.
At Hearts, his reluctance to consistently use two out-and-out wingers was influenced not only by a desire for central stability but also by personnel limitations. A lack of trusted options at right back and right wing forced adaptation, moving Alexandros Kyziridis to the right ahead of a narrow full-back and playing a midfielder, often Blair Spittal, from the left ahead of an overlapping full-back.
McInnes wants to utilise two forwards, though Lawrence Shankland’s interpretation of the second striker role differs from how Ryan Naderi operated under Rohl. Shankland acts more as a link player who, at his best, can drop into midfield before arriving late in the box, allowing Rangers to attack with two forwards effectively.
With limited natural width available, McInnes has been creative. We’ve often seen Mohamed Diomande start from the right before drifting into the channel or half space in the final third, with the right back providing width on that flank and a winger wide on the left, allowing Tuur Rommens to attack the half spaces.
Or, as was the case against West Ham, in a midfield three, ahead of a wide back four.
You would expect that, when a natural right winger is available, McInnes' right back will sit slightly deeper, allowing Rommens to advance more aggressively from the opposite side. While McInnes will use two natural wingers at times, deploying a midfielder wide can provide an extra central presence, useful in certain game states. Don't be surprised if Aasgaard and Diomande are the wide options against Dundee United, with Rommens tasked with offering width.
Another key difference from Rohl is out-of-possession structure. Rohl’s narrow attacking shape informed a compact defensive block, whereas McInnes favours more direct, man-for-man engagements. That approach is likely to stretch the pitch both in and out of possession.
Why this change matters
While there have been no major casualties from the shift in style, recruitment has clearly targeted midfielders more comfortable operating in a pair rather than a three, a continuation of last summer’s strategy.
The biggest structural shift is in midfield. Under Rohl, it was common to see a 3-6-1 in the final third, with both full-backs high and midfielders supporting build-up, creating a fluid front four to overload the opposition’s defensive line.
McInnes, by contrast, is more likely to keep one full-back deeper unless the game state allows both to advance, ensuring greater protection through the centre, attacking in more of a 3-2-5.
In simple terms, his side will often adopt a lopsided shape to provide an extra layer of cover behind the ball, probably ensuring a little more protection in the middle of the park. Whether that restraint is loosened in home games, where Rangers must break down deep blocks, remains to be seen. The foundation, however, is more controlled and defensively secure, with two strikers leading the line.
Why wingers are vital
If there is one profile Rangers have lacked in recent years, it is the type McInnes referenced after the draw with West Ham: players who can isolate opponents one-on-one and operate effectively on either flank.
Too often, Rangers have struggled against low blocks not only due to the absence of a tempo-setting midfielder, the kind once embodied by Steven Davis, but also because of a lack of players capable of beating their man. Not since Michael Beale’s side featured Malik Tillman, Ryan Kent and Todd Cantwell has that been a consistent strength.
Beating a defender forces a decision: step out and leave space behind, or hold position and concede territory. McInnes needs players who can disrupt defensive structures and others who can capitalise on the spaces created.
He noted that while Rangers have multiple effective strikers, only Chermiti consistently creates chances for himself. The others rely more on service, crosses or through balls.
Aasgaard’s drop of the shoulder against West Ham, drawing a foul, was a good example of the required one-on-one quality, turning a static situation into a dangerous one with a single action.
Aasgaard was also particularly effective at helping his team to build up with similar back-to-goal moments vs West Ham; creating separation and space.
By contrast, Djeidi Gassama’s struggles in promising positions highlighted the gap between accessing space and making it count.
One concern from pre-season is the lack of goals, with only two penalties scored in the games at Ibrox, but ultimately, execution comes down to individuals. Where Rohl often sought chances through regains and transitions, McInnes places greater emphasis on structure and individual quality in the final third.
As Pep Guardiola has often said, a coach’s job is to deliver the ball into the final third with the right structure; what follows depends on the players’ decision-making and execution.
And Andrew Cavenagh noted earlier this summer, “the best coaches often have the best squads”. Rangers may still have work to do to fully equip McInnes with that level of resource domestically. A platform has been established in pre-season, but quality is needed to make it count.
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